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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates agents’ behavior in a world with financial frictions
such as financial regulations and information asymmetries. The three chapters of
the dissertation are devoted to answering the following questions: Does financial
regulation slow credit supply growth by imposing higher lending standards on banks?
How does business volatility contribute to the declining firm entry rate in recent
decades through credit channel? How does a financially distressed firm respond to
risks when it is deemed "too big to fail"?
Although widely acknowledged for enhancing financial stability, the Dodd-Frank
Act (DFA) has continued to attract criticisms arguing that it contracts credit supply,
and, as a consequence, reduces GDP and creates pressure on unemployment. In
chapter I, I provide empirical and theoretical evidence on DFA’s negative impacts on
credit supply. Based on a structural banking model, I find that DFA has reduced
credit supply by at least 3.1% of the current volume of bank credit. This sizable
loss partially validates the concern that the Wall Street reform put a strain on the
economy and prevented it from fully recovering through credit channels.
In chapter II, I present empirical and theoretical evidence suggesting that unex-
pected surging economic uncertainty hurts startups through credit channel: rising
default rates accompanying heightened economic turbulence drive up credit spreads.
v
With startups facing increasing funding costs, entry barriers go up and entry rates
decline. Through simulations of an industry model incorporating dynamic entry and
exit, I show that unexpected uncertainty shocks can generate larger and more persis-
tent impact on economic outputs in a world with financial frictions than that without
the frictions.
In Chapter III, I argue that the risk-taking behavior of a financially distressed firm
is exacerbated if the equity holders have larger bargaining power over debt holders.
Using a firm’s valuation model which permits endogenous default on debt, I show that
the threshold value triggering risk-taking behavior is positively related to the equity
holders’ bargaining power in debt renegotiations. Therefore, firms anticipating a final
bailout intentionally undertake more risky investments.
vi
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1Chapter 1
An Unintended Effect of Dodd-Frank Act:
The Hidden Costs We Pay For A Safer
Financial System
“[T]he compliance costs associated with the Dodd-Frank Act paid by
customers and stockholders are large... Mid-size banks often avoid prof-
itable growth or acquisitions because they want to avoid an increased
regulatory burden. Large banks bear unique compliance costs, such as
stress testing based on highly questionable criteria, which probably does
little to limit systemic risk but crimps the credit supply.” (Four Principles
for Replacing the Dodd-Frank, Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2017)
In discussion of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act), people generally agree that it makes the financial system of United
States much safer now than before financial crisis. With higher capital, liquidity, and
risk governance standards, financial institutions are better prepared to withstand
future disruptions 1. However, the increased soundness of the banking system come
with costs. In this paper, I argue that the Dodd-Frank Act slows the bank credit
growth – an unintended effect arise from tighter banking lending standards.
As a stylized fact, private credits extended to households and non-financial busi-
nesses grow at a slower pace in this round of recovery than they did in all previous
1See Archaya and Rechardson (2012) for a complete review of the Dodd-Frank Act.
2recoveries2. Admittedly, it originates in weaker credit demand – elevated economic
uncertainties in the wake of sub-prime crisis significantly reduced firm leverage and
investments. Still, we can’t rule out factors from credit supply. Stringent regulations
on bank lending newly established by the Dodd-Frank Act are potentially curbing
the credit supply growth. For example, required by “Enhanced Prudential Standard”
(EPS), banks need to establish a stand-alone, board-level risk committee in identify-
ing, assessing, and managing risk exposures. Against the backdrop of raising economic
risk, banks become less willing to lend to firms and households 3. In addition, bank
industry now faces higher capital requirements. Research4 points out that increase in
capital requirements typically raises lending costs and reduces lending volume. Fur-
thermore, the “Ability-to-Repay” rule, a new rule particularly applied to mortgage
markets, have been found affecting the price and availability of credits in the U.S.
mortgage market5
Though the list of rules potentially reducing credit supply goes long, it is difficult
to quantify the magnitude of credit losses, if any. One key challenge is identifica-
tion. To identify the credit losses caused by the Dodd-Frank Act, we need to find a
counter-factual benchmark with no regulations, so that we can answer the question:
how much banking credits would be supplied if there were no regulations? In this
2“Slow Credit Recovery and Excess Returns on Capital”,Zheng Liu and Andrew Tai,FRBSF
Economic Letter,September 26, 2016.
3Jamine Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, commented on the question of how much banks’
are hands tied by regulations right now: “One is, small-business startups are very low. Lower than
they’ve ever been in a recovery, and one of the reasons is regulations. Banks are much more re-
luctant to make what I’ll call small-business startup loans... But the even bigger one, and this
one I think is uncontestable, is that the mortgage rules and requirements are so onerous that
the cost of a mortgage is like 20 or 30 basis points higher and certain groups of people have re-
duced mortgage availability and it might be as much as $500 billion a year. So you go back five
years, fix those rules five years ago, you might have made $2.5 trillion. Knock that in half. That
is a lot of loan growth that we did not get. That loan growth would have fueled homebuild-
ing, home formation, jobs, and those also would have fueled business for middle-market, small
businesses.” http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20170809/NEWS01/170809841/from-illinois-
woes-to-the-state-of-credit-jamie-dimon-lets-loose.
4See the survey by Martynova (2015).
5Defusco, Johnson and Mondragon (2016).
3paper, I approach the problem by investigating banks with assets in close proxim-
ity to 10 billion – a threshold above which banks become the major targets of new
regulations. In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act established Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) as an additional regulator supervising all the banks with assets more
than 10 billion. If regulations affect credit supply, I expect to see banks below and
above 10 billion display different lending behaviors.
I apply two types of empirical methodology to identify bank behavior differences:
bunching and regression discontinuity design. Bunching approach is a new empirical
method in economics in recent years 6. It originally analyzes individuals bunching
around point that marks discontinuity in tax incentives, and estimates tax-related
structural parameters. Though initially developed to estimate tax, it now finds appli-
cations in other areas and settings. For instance, Terry (2017) documents that public
firm profits bunch above Wall Street forecast and identifies that these firms are more
likely to cut down R&D investments to meet the street forecast. As another example,
Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen (2016) applies bunching approach to show how
firm size-contingent labor regulation can be used to identify the welfare costs of the
laws. My paper follows the similar approach to identify credit losses resulted from the
Dodd-Frank Act. Since the regulations are size-dependent, some institutions hesitate
crossing the $10 billion asset threshold, choosing to restrain growth when they see the
threshold approaching7. As illustrated in Figure 1·1, a comparison of the pattern of
bank asset distributions before and after the Dodd- Frank Act supports this notion.
According to the distribution between 2011 Q3 and 2016 Q3, banks are clearly bunch-
ing at a narrow region to the lower side of 10 billion asset. As a contrast, the bunching
is absent between 2006 Q3 and 2011 Q2 before CFPB was officially established.
6See Kleven (2016) for a comprehensive review of the bunching literature.
7See “In New Regulatory Era, Banks Approach $10 Billion Warily”, Wall Street Journal,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203918304577239172897160582
4Figure 1·1: Bank asset distribution
Note: The two panels present the bank assets distribution in six years before (left) and after (right) the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau was officially established. The horizontal axis represents the asset bin (with bin size of
1 million), and the vertical axis represents total number of bank with assets in the particular bin. Both axes are in
log scale.
The second related strand of literature is regression discontinuity design (RDD)8.
It is a way of estimating treatment effects in a non-experimental setting where treat-
ment is determined by whether an observed “assignment” variable exceeds a known
cutoff point. In my case, the assignment variable is bank asset size. Considering
that net loans and leases count about two-thirds of total assets for a typical bank,
I suspect banks adjusting net loans and leases to manipulate asset size in order to
avoid regulations. In other words, I want to see if banks just below 10 billion show
slower net loans and leases growth comparing to banks just above. Figure 1·2 plots
net loans and leases growth rate against asset. The solid curve lines on each side of
the threshold are polynomial fit using data points in relevant region, and we see clear
discontinuity of loan growth rate around the threshold. Researchers might point out
that bank bunching violates an important assumption in RDD: individuals can’t ma-
nipulate assignment variable. Namely, banks should be smoothly distributed around
8See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a comprehensive review of RDD literature.
5the cutoff point. However, the assumption is trivial here as I’m not claiming any
treatment effect from regulation on loan growth rate. Rather, I’m arguing that it is
exactly because of banks’ manipulation on assets that we observe discontinuity. As
I will show in my model, the manipulation is an optimal choice of banks to maxi-
mize profit when facing regulations, and the magnitude of resulted loan growth rate
discontinuity help to infer regulation costs in the model setting.
Figure 1·2: Loan growth rate discontinuity
Note: The chart represents a panel of 54,257 bank-quarters covering 2011 Q3 - 2016 Q2 for banks with assets between
100 million and 100 billion. Asset bin on the horizontal axis are log scaled. The bin size is 0.1 of ten base logarithm
of asset. Blue points are mean growth rate of net loans and leases for banks falling into the corresponding asset bin.
The vertical dash line is 10 billion threshold. The red lines on each side of the threshold are second order polynomial
fit using blue sample points in relevant region.
The above evidences on asset bunching and loan growth rate discontinuity facts
around 10 billion suggest that regulations are costly to banks. To address the issue, ,
I build a model treating regulation as an implicit costs on bank lending. The model
shows two types of bank credit losses resulted from regulations. I call these two types
as indirect and direct credit losses respectively. Indirect credit losses describe the
potential losses that unregulated banks afford– as banks get closer to the cutoff, they
6slow down loan growth rate in order to avoid regulations. Direct losses are associated
with regulated banks. Once banks eventually cross the line and become regulated,
they face permanently higher compliance costs in lending practices, therefore they
optimally choose less amount of loans.
Draw on the quarterly Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (“Call Re-
ports”), I estimate model parameters using Method of Moments. With the estimates,
I perform a counter-factual analysis and estimate the size of potential credit losses.
According to my estimation, total bank credit losses due to regulation is more than
2.4%9. Among them, about 10% counts for indirect losses as a result of asset manip-
ulation, and 90% counts for the direct loss due to higher lending costs imposed by
regulations.
The paper is organized as below. Section 1 describes empirical facts of credit
losses related to the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 2 builds a structural model featuring
regulation costs and estimates key parameters. Section 3 shows that estimated model
delivers key facts we have observed in the data. Section 4 carries out an counter-
factual analysis and estimates the aggregate credit losses caused by the Dodd-Frank
Act. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Banking Distortion in the Data
1.1.1 Regulation Background
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was born in
the aftermath of 2008-2009 financial crisis. As the largest financial regulation of
United States since the 1930s, the Dodd-Frank Act aims to control risk-taking incen-
tives of large complex financial institutions and the systemic risk they produce. It
closed many loopholes in regulatory capital requirements that large financial insti-
9The actual loss in the data could be more than that as the simulation focus on mid to big size
banks with equities between 10 million to 5 billion.
7tutions had once exploited before crisis to fast expand balance sheets at consumers’
risk. In addition, it issues a wide range of new rules to strengthen capital, reduce
leverage, improve balance sheet liquidity and bring greater standardization and trans-
parency to derivatives markets. It also imposes new rules on credit card availability
and debit-interchange fees, along with heightened regulatory and judicial scrutiny of
bank lending and other practices.
Though well acknowledged for improving bank’s resiliency to tail risks to its as-
sets10,the Dodd-Frank Act has been consistently subject to critics of financial practi-
tioners. Among many accusations is that the Dodd-Frank Act cuts down bank’s credit
supply by significantly raising the lending standards. As a result, low-income con-
sumers and small businesses – which generally have fewer or less effective alternatives
to bank credit – have paid the largest price for increased bank regulation11.
In principle, it is tricky to evaluate the regulations’ impact on bank credits con-
sidering the endogeneity of credit growth and the economic growth. In this paper, I
overcome the issue by investigating lending behaviors of banks who have different ex-
posure to the law. If regulations matter for bank credit supply, I expect to see banks
behave differently when they face variant strength of regulations. A key feature of
the Dodd-Frank Act is that regulation standards are size-dependent: banks falling
into different asset brackets are subject to different requirements. The larger a bank
is, the more stringent rules it faces. Table 1.1 lists the asset size cutoff, associated
additional regulation requirements, number of banks falling into that size bracket and
their asset share. Though there are three thresholds, the most critical asset threshold
for bank is 10 billion above which banks are regulated by an additional regulator
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and subject to major rules of the
10See “Did the Dodd-Frank Act Make the Financial System Safer?”, St Louis Fed,
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2017/february/dodd-frank-act-financial-system-safer.
11See “Who Pays for Bank Regulation?”, June 2014, Global Markets Institute, Goldman Sachs.
8Dodd Frank Act12. To see the point, notice the abnormal bank bunching at 10 billion
illustrated in Figure 1·1 . Evidently, 10 billion is the only bunching point. I thus
focus on banks within a narrow range below 10 billion. The following two subsections
present detailed evidences for behavior changes of banks when they cross 10 billion.
Table 1.1: The Dodd-Frank Act’s size-dependent requirements
Size bracket Additional regulations (selection) Number of banks Asset share
≥ 10 billion (1) Oversight by CFPB;
(2) Durbin Amendment;
(3) Enhanced prudential standards;
(4) Stress-testing requirement ;
(5) Independent risk committee; etc.
113 81.8%
≥ 50 billion (1) Higher capital and leverage
requirement; (2) Enhanced requirement
in stress-testing;etc.
46 71.8%
≥ 250 billion Enhanced Supplementary Leverage
Leverage Ratio, etc.
10 52.0%
Note: The statistics on banks are based on Call Reports in 2016 Q2.
1.1.2 Bank Bunching Evidence
In this section, I show evidence of banks bunching below 10 billion asset threshold.
I later argue in the model section that the bunching phenomena can be explained by
bank’s effort to avoid regulation.
The data source I draw is quarterly Consolidated Report of Condition and In-
come (Call Reports) for all FDIC insured banks of United States. The data spans
between 2011 Q3 – 2016 Q2. I chose 2011 Q3 as the starting point because the CFPB
was officially established at July 21, 2011, and 2011 Q3 marks the beginning of the
regulatory overhaul. The data are individual bank level data. This particular level
of data suits my research as the regulation threshold applies to individual bank as
well as higher bank holding company level. More than 7000 banks are available in an
12Lack of large enough sample size of big banks is an important reason we don’t observe bunching
around higher asset threshold
9unbalanced panel.
The standard method in current bunching literature (Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven
and Waseem, 2013) constructs two steps in general. First, plot the distribution of the
variable of interest using the bin size that is big enough to smooth out the distribution
but not too big to maintain the bunching in the related region; Second, fit high-order
polynomial to the observed distribution while excluding the data in a region immedi-
ately surrounding the threshold and then extrapolating this polynomial through the
omitted region.
My procedure is consistent with standard way in general except that I transform
the asset data by taking natural log of them. Without doing these, I would end up
with an asset distribution of most sample points located in the higher end of asset
spectrum. The issue with this type of distribution is that it becomes quite noisy in
the big bank region as there are very limited number of big banks there 13, just like
what we observe in Figure 1·1. To generate the log asset distribution, I group banks
with assets between 400 million to 400 billion into 31 bins using natural log of assets.
I choose this particular bin size to make the empirical distribution smooth enough
while still maintain the bunching evidence. Denote the log asset bin k as logAk , then
bank density for the bin k, pk , is calculated as the asset share of banks falling into
asset bracket [logAk−1, logAk). Once I obtain the distribution, I then estimate the
polynomial functional form specified as below
pk =
p∑
i=0
αi (logAk)
i +
∑
logAj∈[logAL,logAH ]
βj1 [logAk = logAj] + vk
where p is the order of the polynomial, αi is the associated coefficient of the polynomial
term, [logAL, logAH ] is the excluding region of bins, βj is the coefficient for dummy
variable indicating bank falling into a particular asset bin logAj between logAL and
13For example, as illustrated in Table 1.1, only 46 banks among all more than 7000 banks are
above 50 billion in the second quarter of 2016.
10
logAH . I’ll explain how to choose logAL, logAH later. vk is the error term. With the
estimates, I calculate the counter-factual distribution using
pˆk =
p∑
i=0
αˆi (logAk)
i + vk
the total bunching bank density using
Db =
∑
βˆj1
[
logAL ≤ j < logA¯
]
and the total missing bank density using
Dm =
∑
βˆj1
[
logA¯ ≤ j < logAH
]
where logA¯ is the asset cutoff.
To estimate the boundary of excluding region logAL and logAH , I first compare
the density of the bins closely below the threshold 10 billion and choose the asset
bin with the minimum density as logAL. I then vary logAH from a range of points
above the threshold to minimize the total bunching bank density net of missing bank
density Db−|Dm|. Figure 1·3 shows the actual asset distribution and counter-factual
distribution. The three vertical lines from left to right are AL, A¯, AH accordingly.
Based on the estimation, Db = 0.0027, AL = 6.31 billion, and AH = 15.8 billion.
1.1.3 Loan Growth Rate Discontinuity Evidence
Bunching evidence in the previous section suggests that banks are manipulating
their assets to avoid regulation, so a natural question to ask is: which part of assets
are they manipulating? In theory, if banks below the threshold slow asset growth
rate, we expect to see discontinuity of growth rate around the threshold. Following
standard regression discontinuity literature14, I estimate growth rate discontinuity of
14See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for comprehensive review on Regression Discontinuity Design.
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Figure 1·3: Banks bunch below 10 billion threshold
Note: Red dotted line is actual asset distribution for banks with assets between 400 million and 400 billion between
2011 Q3 - 2016 Q2. Blue line is the counter-factual asset distribution ruling out bunching affected region. The three
vertical lines mark the left boundary of bunching affected region AL, the threshold A¯ and the right boundary of
bunching affected region AH .
major asset components: total assets, net loans and leases, equities, Cash & Balances
due from depository institutions, commercial and industrial loans, real estate loans in
domestic offices and loans to individuals. After jointly removing the top and bottom
5% outliers of quarterly growth rate of these major asset components, I end up with
around 3300 banks in an unbalanced panel. Table 1.2 provides a descriptive statistics.
I apply a standard regression discontinuity estimator to various outcomes of interest
by estimating a local linear regression
Xit = α+βAit+γ(log(Ait)−log(A¯))1(log(Ait) ≥ log(A¯))+δ1(log(Ait) ≥ log(A¯))+it
Here, Xit is some outcome of interest for bank i in quarter t and Ait is the bank’s
asset level, δ represents the local difference in the conditional mean of X between
banks just above 10 billion and banks just below. Table 1.3 reports the results.
12
According to estimations, banks just above the threshold in terms of net loans and
leases grow by 0.67% faster than bank just below it at 10% significant level . As to
sub-category of net loans and leases, only domestic real estate loans shows significant
discontinuity. Note for interpretation that Table 1.3 does not report treatment effect
of regulation – unlike traditional regression discontinuity design whose major goal is
to identify causal differences resulted from treatment. In fact, it is normally critical to
make sure of smoothness of density of assignment variable (i.e. asset in my context)
and no sorting is involved, but bank bunching evidence in my case clearly violates
the assumption. I argue that the assumption is trivial in this paper since my goal
differs from a typical one. In particular, the sorting around 10 billion is exact the
reason for loan growth rate discontinuity. I later verify in the model that loan growth
rate discontinuity is consistent with opportunist cuts in loan growth rate to avoid the
regulation. The regression discontinuity estimator simply serves as a useful moment
to estimate the size of regulation. In fact, the discontinuity estimator as well as
bunching estimators in previous section are important moments to pin down key
model parameters.
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
Asset share
(%)
Growth rate
(Quarterly, %)
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
main asset components
Cash & Balances 8.59 6.32 7.37 4.62 0.61 28.97
Total securities 23.54 21.62 14.40 0.14 -0.44 6.59
Net loans and leases 61.17 62.73 14.47 1.09 0.95 2.79
main loan components
Real est. loans 45.72 46.28 15.72 1.00 0.80 2.88
C&I loans 8.04 6.72 5.99 1.12 0.53 7.66
Loans to Ind. 3.45 2.31 4.45 -0.42 -0.73 6.01
Observations 71969 71969
I now compare loan growth rate in quarter t + k, k ∈ [−4, 4] for banks that cross
the threshold in quarter t. This serves as an additional detection of the behavior
13
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change of banks crossing the regulation threshold. In particular, I run the following
regression:
gi,t+k = δt + δi +
k=4∑
k=−4
βkDk (1.1)
where gi,t+k is the growth rate of net loans and leases for bank i at quarter t+ k. Dk
is the dummy variable indicating bank is k quarters before or after the the period t
when it crosses the threshold. βk is the coefficients measuring the behavior difference
as banks gradually move closer or further from the regulation threshold. δt and δi
are fixed effects. Figure 1·4 plots coefficient βk against period k. In periods before
bank crosses the threshold, its loan growth gradually slow down. It then speeds up to
cross the cutoff, consistent with the loan growth rate discontinuity evidence reported
in Table 1.3. It also worths noticing that loan growth rate goes down again as bank
moves further above 10 billion. As I later show in the model, this is due to higher
regulation costs imposed on banking lending.
1.2 A Bank Model of Regulation costs
In this section I present a quantitative model of bank growth with regulations,
followed by a discussion of numerical solution method, and structural estimation of
the model.
There is a continuum of heterogeneous banks, and bank i at period t is endowed
with equity Eit. Equities grows exogenously at rate of ge. Aggregate equities then
grow at at same speed Et+1 = (1 + ge)Et. Denote the equity share of each bank in
relative to total equities as
ei =
Eit
Et
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Figure 1·4: Bank loan growth dynamics
Note: The solid line is the average net loans and leases growth rate for banks in the kth quarter before or after
the period they cross 10 billion threshold. k = 0 indicates time when they cross the threshold. Standard errors
are clustered at bank level, with 95% point-wise confidence intervals plotted in dashed lines. Sample includes 273
bank-quarters spanning 2011 Q3 – 2016 Q2 with banks that had crossed 10 billion during the sample period.
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The distribution of bank equity share satisfies the power low15
f(ei) = γ1e
−γ2
i
where γ2 is the exponent parameter and γ1 is the normalization parameter satisfying
γ1 =
1∑
i e
−γ2
i
.
Bank i at period t maximizes the expected profit next period Et [pii,t+1] defined
as the net interest margin net of management costs and regulation costs. Net in-
terest margin by definition is the difference between lending revenues and borrowing
costs. The lending and deposit interest rate are denoted as rl and rd respectively.
Management costs are positively correlated with deposit size Di,t+1 and negatively
correlated with equity size Ei,t+1. To capture the idea that over-leverage incur big
risk thus bring up the costs nonlinearly, I model the management costs as quadratic
form ψD
2
i.t+1
Ei,t+1
where ψ is the management cost parameters. As for the regulation costs
Ti,t+1, I let it to be conditional on the asset size – it applies only when bank assets
exceed 10 billion. The total amount of regulation taxes is proportional to the lending
volume with costs rate denoted as τ 16.
Bank maximizes the expected profit by choosing the loan commitment next period
Lcit+1. Two types of uncertainty are involved. One, the actual loans outstanding
next period Li,t+1 is different to loans commitment due to economic uncertainty.
For example, bank faces unpredictable line of credits withdrawal and credit demand
change in real world. To capture it, I let actual outstanding loans next period to
be Lci,t+1ext+1 , where xt+1 is a normal distributed random variable xt+1 ∼ N(0, σx).
Two, reported asset size differs from actual asset size because of measurement errors. I
introduce measurement errors out of two major concerns. On one hand, outsiders like
regulators can’t observe the actual asset size but rely on the reported asset level Ait+1,
15See Section 5 Robustness Check for an alternative version using log normal distribution.
16See Section 5 Robustness Check for an alternative version of fixed costs.
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so bank has incentives to report a lower asset level in order to avoid size-dependent
regulation. On the other, bank in nature can’t measure its actual asset size with
absolute precision, especially when it comes to large bank with many subsidiaries and
branches. To capture measure error, I model the ratio of reported assets and actual
ones as eyt+1 , where yt+1 is a normal distributed random variable yt+1 ∼ N(0, σy).
The actual asset size in the next period is the sum of deposits Di,t+1 and equity Ei,t+1,
so Ait+1 = (Di,t+1 + Ei,t+1) eyt+1 .
Figure 1·5: Time-line of bank operation
Figure 1·5 shows the time-line of bank decisions. At the end of period t, bank
chooses the loan commitment in the next period. In the beginning of next period,
bank equities grow as predicted. Economic uncertainty xt+1 is also revealed so bank
knows how much loans it needs to underwrite. After that, bank has to collect deposits
to meet loans demand and the minimum cash reserve requirement according to which
cash reserve is no less than a ratio β of total deposits. Once deposits are in place,
measurement errors are realized, and bank reports the total asset level to regulators.
18
The profit maximization problem can be written as
Lci,t+1 = argmaxEx,y
[
rlL
c
i,t+1e
xi,t+1 − rdDi,t+1 − ψD2i,t+1/Eit+1 − Ti,t+1
]
s.t. Di,t+1 ≥
Lci,t+1e
xi,t+1 − Ei,t+1
1− β
Ai,t+1 = (Di,t+1 + Ei,t+1) e
yi,t+1
Ti,t+1 = τL
c
i,t+1e
xi,t+11Ai,t+1≥A¯
Ei,t+1 = Eit(1 + ge)
xi,t+1 ∼ normal(−1
2
σ2x, σ
2
x)
yi,t+1 ∼ normal(−1
2
σ2y, σ
2
y)
where first constraint specifies the cash reserve requirement, second one captures the
discrepancy between actual and report assets, third one describes the regulation costs,
and fourth one is the exogenous evolution of the equity level.
My solution of the model, explained in detail in Appendix, requires fixing the
values of many parameters. I structurally estimate the model using Method of Mo-
ments. Before estimating the model I externally calibrate some parameters. The
model period is one quarter. I set the reserve ratio β = 0.1, according to the require-
ment of Federal Reserve Board. I set deposit rate rd = 0.025% – the mean value of 3
month National Rate on Non-Jumbo Deposits (less than $100,000) between 2011Q3-
2016Q2. The equity growth rate ge is calibrated as 1.3% based on the Call Reports
2011Q3-2016Q2.
Method of Moments approach requires five informative moments for identification
of the remaining five parameters, including interest rate spread rl − rd, management
cost ψ, regulation cost τ , S.D. of the economic uncertainty σx, S.D. of bank size mea-
surement error σy, the exponent of asset distribution fu. I estimate these parameters
to target net interest rate margin, leverage (asset-to-equity ratio), bunching bank
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density, starting asset point of bunching and loan growth rate discontinuity. The em-
pirical moments are estimated using Call Reports data described in section 1. Table
1.4 lists estimated parameters , and five targeted moments together with their data
and model values.
Table 1.4: Parameters and Moments
parameter estimate moment empirical model
rl−rd interest ratespread 1.02%
rlL
cex−rdD
A
net interest rate
margin
0.93% 0.95%
ψ
management
cost 0.05% A/E leverage
9.45 9.42
τ regulation cost 0.07% Db
bunching
bank density
0.003 0.003
σx
S.D. of
outstanding loan
uncertainty
0.048 δ loan growth rate
discontinuity
0.67% 0.67%
σy
S.D. of
measurement
errors
0.133 AL
bunching
start 6.31× 10
6 6.31× 106
Note: The table displays parameter notation(first column), explanation(second column) and
estimate(third column) on the left, as well as moment notation(fourth column), explanation(fifth
column), empirical value (sixth column) and model value(seventh column) on the right.
1.3 Assessing the Model
Along multiple dimensions - the cross-section of bank assets distribution, discon-
tinuity of loans growth and the dynamics of loans growth - I show in this section the
estimated model delivers some basic facts observed from the micro data.
Empirically, bank assets display bunching. For comparison, Figure 1·6 plots asset
distribution in the baseline model with regulation (in red dotted line) and in the model
without regulation (in blue dashed line). The size-dependent regulations targeting
banks with more than 10 billion assets lead to a bulge on the lower side of 10 billion.
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At odds with the data, the model without regulation costs delivers a smooth asset
distribution.
Figure 1·6: Model simulated asset distribution
Note: The distribution is a simulation of a bank industry with 5000 banks for 24 quarters. Bank assets range from 400
million to 400 billion. Red dotted line represents the model with regulation costs, and blue line without regulation.
The vertical line marks 10 billion threshold.
Before proceeding further, note that Figure 1·6 and the rest of the results incorpo-
rate some noises in reported asset size and actual loan outstanding within the model
laid out above. Why are noises useful? Quantitative models with discontinuities in
tax liability yield stark sorting across thresholds (Kleven & Waseem (2013)), and the
literature routinely incorporates some quantitative addition, such as measurement
error in order to allow for looser sorting. My model is no exception. A range of banks
with assets just above the 10 billion threshold never occurs if uncertainties about
measurement errors in assets were ignored. The additional noise in actual loan out-
standing is also useful to jointly match moments of asset bunching and loan growth
rate discontinuity.
Bank’s policy function, as illustrated in Figure 1·7, reveals more details about
regulations’ impact on bank lending. The rich dynamics of divergence between loan
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commitments with and without regulations suggests that regulations create significant
distortions in bank lending. In principle, optimal loan commitments decision is about
trade-off between marginal gains and costs of additional amount of lending. As bank
equities grow, the first type of distortion brought by regulations is bank sorting to
stay small, as documented in Figure 1·6. Knowing that higher level loan commitment
is likely to trigger higher compliance costs in lending, bank is reluctant to raise loan
commitments proportionally to equity growth. The associated credit loss is reflected
in loan commitments discrepancy in area between line A and B in Figure 1·7. The
second type of distortion, which is more dominant, happens when bank equity size is so
big that bank is forced to cross the regulation threshold and incur permanently higher
lending costs from compliance. Correspondingly, we see enlarging loan commitments
discrepancy in area beyond line C. Notice that there is a short-term ’catch up’ effect
in bank lending depicted in area between line B and line C. In fact, line B marks
bank transition from unregulated to regulated, and the narrowing loan commitment
difference is due to bank’s effort to make up the potential loan losses resulted from
opportunistic cut at earlier periods. This distortion leads to loan growth discontinuity
around the regulation cutoff.
I now discuss additional evidences on loan growth rate discontinuity. Figure 1·8
plots simulated bank assets on the horizontal axis and the actual outstanding loan
growth on the vertical axis. Banks just below the 10 billion threshold have lower out-
standing loan growth rate, indicating that they intentionally slow down loan growth
to postpone being regulated. Consistent with policy function, once banks cross the
line, they temporarily overshoot loan growth to compensate the loan losses in previ-
ous periods. As bank assets continue to grow, loan growth rate gradually falls due to
higher compliance costs in lending.
The third basic fact we observe in the data is that bank starts to slow its loan
22
Figure 1·7: Bank policy function
Figure 1·8: Loan growth rate discontinuity: model simulation
Note: The figure plots simulated panel data of loan growth rate and assets of model with regulation. Sample banks
have assets between 100 million and 100 billion. Asset bins on the horizontal axis are log scaled. The bin size is 0.1
of ten base logarithm of asset. Blue points are mean growth rate of net loans and leases for banks falling into the
corresponding asset bin. The vertical dash line is 10 billion threshold. The red lines on each side of the threshold are
second order polynomial fit using sample points in relevant region. The discontinuity for outstanding loan is estimated
to be 6.7% using a local linear regression discontinuity estimator. The running variable is log asset level (with unit
thousand). The bandwidth is 0.7 chosen via the optimal Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) approach.
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growth rate several quarters ahead of the period t when it crosses the regulation
threshold. Model simulation delivers a similar dynamic process. Using simulated
data, I run the panel regression specified in Equation 1.1. Figure 1·9 plots the esti-
mated coefficients βk against dummies Dk specified in the following regression. βk is
interpreted as the average loan growth rate for banks that are k quarters away from
the date when it crosses the regulation cutoff. The model with regulation (the red
line) exhibits lower loan growth when bank is quarters before regulation threshold
and temporary overshoot of loan growth rate after it crosses the line. These rich
dynamics are absent in the model without regulation illustrated in blue dot line.
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Figure 1·9: Loan growth dynamics: model simulation
Note: The figure plots the estimated coefficients βk against dummies Dk specified in the following regression:gi,t+k =
δt + δi +
∑k=4
k=−4 βkDk, using the simulated model with and without regulation respectively . βk is interpreted as the
average loan growth rate for banks that are k quarters away from the date when it crosses the regulation cutoff.
1.4 The Cost of Regulation
I have rationalized the model in previous section by replicating key empirical
facts using the model. I now estimate the credit supply losses caused by regulations
applying the model and discuss the economic implications. Throughout, I center
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my analysis on a comparison of the economy with regulation (baseline) to the no
regulation counter-factual.
Figure 1·10 displays accumulated sum of outstanding loans conditional on the
value of the equity for the baseline and counter-factual economy. The red line shows
the accumulated sum of loans in the model with regulation, and blue line without
regulation. In general, bank facing tightened regulations provides less amount of
loans. As I have discussed in Section 3, the potential credit losses are either directly
or indirectly resulted from the regulation. The direct losses describe the amount of
loans a “regulated” bank would otherwise provide if it were not regulated. To quantify
it, I first locate banks that acquire assets more than 10 billion in both regulated and
unregulated case. I then calculate the direct credit losses as the additional amount
outstanding loans they have in the unregulated environment in relative to the reg-
ulated one. The indirect losses rise from bank’s attempt to avoid regulation, and it
captures how much a “regulation fearing” bank would instead supply if has no such
concern. I identify a group of banks staying on the lower side of threshold in regulated
environment. Note that these banks could be bigger if it were not of regulation. So
the difference of total outstanding loans provided by this group of bank in regulated
and unregulated environment represents the indirect credit losses. According to my
estimation, the total credit supply loss is 3.1% of aggregate loans in the regulated
economy. To break it down, around 80% directly comes from regulation, and 20%
indirectly comes from banks sorting to stay small and unregulated. Note that the
calculation represents for banks with assets between 100 million and 50 billion (equi-
ties between around 10 million and 5 billion as correspondence) , therefore, the credit
losses estimated in the following context are associated with this particular range of
banks. That being said, this figure serves as the reference of credit losses for the
universal banks.
25
Figure 1·10: Accumulated loans conditional on equity: model simu-
lation
Note: The figure displays accumulated sum of loans for banks with equity between 10 million and 5 billion. Blue line
represents loan supply without regulation, and red line with regulation. The discrepancy between blue and red line
shows credit loss from regulation. The jagged edge of curves is due to discretization of equity in model solution, and
it should vanish if I choose a total equity grid points big enough.
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Though well acknowledged for strengthening the safety and soundness of the bank-
ing system, the Dodd-Frank Act is reducing credit supply as an unintended side effect
according to the data and model. Considering the close connection between credit
supply and real economy, it is likely that the negative credit shock has contributed to
the slow recovery post 07-09 financial crisis. As a stylized fact, the current recovery is
the slowest one in recent 50 years in terms of consumer demand growth and unemploy-
ment rate etc. Besides, we had barely seen signs of inflation after years of recession
despite of three rounds of quantitative easing totaled amount 3.5 trillion. These puz-
zles can be at least partially explained by the unexpected negative credit supply shock
imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. Credit supply affects real economy mainly through
two channels. On one hand, it boosts demand, especially by household. On the other
hand, it stimulates the labor productivity growth by loosing the credit constraint of
firms and better the resource allocation. A growing body of theoretical and empirical
research provide evidence for these channels 17. For example, a lot of researchers18
look into the bank deregulation of United States in 1980s and show that the dereg-
ulation by expanding the credit supply had significantly boosted household demand,
price, wages and employment. If positive credit supply shock from deregulation has
such big impacts on the economy, we shouldn’t under estimate the economic costs of
the Dodd-Frank Act. The estimated credit losses equal to 3.1% of current aggregate
credit supply are potentially restricting demand growth and preventing the economy
to get fully recovered.
17For empirical evidence, see Jorda et al. (2013), Krishnamurthy and Muir (2016), Reinhart and
Rogo↵ (2009), Baron and Xiong (2016), Greenwood and Hanson (2013), Ĺopez-Salido et al. (2016)
and Mian et al. (2017).
18See Mian, Sufi and Verner (2017), Kroszner and Strahan (2014), and so on.
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1.5 Robustness Check
This section considers alternative setup of the model including fixed regulation
costs and log normal equity distribution. Counter-factual analyses using these alter-
natives show the potential loan losses resulted from regulations range from 0.9% to
1.9% of current aggregate loan outstanding, lower than 3.1% in the baseline model.
1.5.1 Fixed Regulation Costs
In the following alternative model, I treat regulation costs as fixed instead of
variable costs in the baseline model. In general, the regulations costs are composed
of fixed part and variant part, and their impacts on the banks vary in nature. Fixed
costs tend to have diminishing effects when bank assets are growing larger, while
the variable costs have more persistent impact. To find out the bottom line of the
regulations’ impact on bank loans, I twist the model by imposing fixed regulation
costs only, that is, bank is subject to a fixed level of regulation costs T when its
assets exceed 10 billion. Based on my estimation, the fixed costs is about 8 million
dollars.
Figure 1·11 and Figure 1·12 compare the major results of three types of model:
one without regulation, one with fixed costs, and one with variable costs. Figure 1·11
illustrates the difference of policy functions. In relative to variable costs, fixed costs
have larger but short-lived impact on bank loans. This implies that fixed costs are
more threatening to banks approaching 10 billion, but once bank crosses the line,
their effects damp out gradually. Figure 1·12 illustrates the difference of potential
accumulated loan loss. Unlike the gradually widening gap caused by variable regula-
tion costs, the loan loss related to fixed costs maintain a stable size as more banks are
included. This implies that more loan losses are associated with smaller banks in fixed
costs model. According to my calculation, the total loan losses generated by fixed
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costs amount to about 0.9% of current aggregate loan outstanding. To decompose
the loan losses, 26% of them come from the loan distortions of bank approaching 10
billion, in contrast to 10% in the model of variable costs.
To sum up, comparing to variable costs, (1) fixed regulation costs have smaller
effects on bank industry – around 0.9% of current aggregate loan outstanding would
otherwise be created if it were not of them; (2) the larger part of losses is associ-
ated with smaller banks as the distortion effects from fixed costs from regulation are
diminished when bank assets grow.
Figure 1·11: Policy function comparison: fixed costs and variable
costs
1.5.2 Log Normal Equity Distribution
This subsection considers log normal distributed equity instead of power law.
Figure 1·13 plots actual log equity density and two related fitting distribution against
log equity level19. I only plot distribution of banks with equity between 10 million
19The equity distribution data comes from Call Report in 2011 Q3. Log normal distribution is the
one with mean and standard deviation matching the corresponding log equity distribution moments.
Power law distribution parameters are estimated from regression of log density and log equity.
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Figure 1·12: Accumulated loans: a comparison of fixed costs and
variable costs
and 20 billion, so the corresponding asset distribution roughly ranges between 100
million and 200 billion which is the asset range my research focuses on. According to
the figure, neither log normal or power law can fit the data perfectly. However, both
log normal and power law have their own comparative advantage: log normal does
better in describing the distribution of smaller banks, while power law does better for
bigger banks.
Figure 1·14 illustrated the accumulated loan losses when underlying bank equity
follows log normal distribution instead of power law. Interestingly, with log normal
bank distribution, the accumulated loan losses for fixed regulation costs get closer to
that for variable costs. This is not hard to understand if we recall that fixed costs
make smaller banks suffer more. Since log normal distribution have more weights
on smaller banks, we are expecting to see more loan losses in the model with fixed
regulation costs and less loan losses with variable costs. According to my simulation,
comparing to model with power law, the potential loan losses from fixed regulation
costs raise from 0.9% to 1.7%, and that from variable costs decline from 2.4% to
30
Figure 1·13: Equity distribution: data and fit
1.9%20.
1.6 Conclusion
Since the beginning of the Dodd-Frank Act era, banks are growingly bunching
below 10 billion asset threshold, above which they are subject to stringent regulations
in capital, liquidity and risk. To avoid regulation, banks choose to slow down the loan
growth to postpone crossing the line. This pattern suggests that the regulations are
costly to bank, and the resulted distortion in bank lending reduce the aggregate
credit supply. The model treating regulation as implicit costs on lending estimates
that regulations impose a quantitatively large negative shock to the credit supply -
around 2.4% more bank credits would otherwise be provided if it were not of the
regulation.
A decade later since the breakout of the sub-prime crisis, we have seen a slowly
recovered economy. Economists and commentators have expressed concerns that post-
20In the log normal model, the fixed regulation costs are estimated to be 15 million, and the
variable costs rate are estimated to be 0.1%.
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Figure 1·14: Accumulated loans with log normal equity distribution
crisis regulations reduce the banks’ initiative to provide credits, and thus prevent the
economy to get fully recovered. The sizable loss in credit supply I quantify in this
paper provides at least a partial validation of such concern. Though soundness of
banking industry is vital to a healthy economy, it does come with costs. This finding
also justifies the current bipartisan bill rolling back the Dodd-Frank Act. The bill
suggests to raise the 50 billions up to 100 billions, and reduce regulation requirements
for banks between 100 billions to 250 billions. According to my research, considering
the significant drop in the compliance costs if the bill was passed, this is expected to
boost credit supply in future.
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Chapter 2
Uncertainty Shocks:
How They Impact Startups and the
Economy
2.1 Introduction
The swings in economic uncertainties have long been argued to contribute to the
well-documented countercyclical behavior of economic variables like firm investment,
labor income, business profits and productivities etc. Two channels stand out in
current mainstream literature. First, considering irreversibility of investment, firms
facing increased business uncertainties choose to wait and see until uncertainties has
been resolved and investment is more likely successful1. Second, in the world fraught
with financial frictions, increasing uncertainties bring up the credit spreads, and in-
duce a decline in firm’s investment spending due to higher user cost of capital2.
However, most of these literature focus on incumbents, and ignore impacts of uncer-
tainties on industry dynamics, and particularly, entry dynamics. Successful entrants
are key engines of the economy: job creation and patent issuances etc. My research
investigates how uncertainty shocks affect entry rate and what implication it has on
the aggregate economy.
Using stock price data, I break down stock market volatility into market uncer-
1See Bernanke, 1983; Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1994, 1996; Caballero and
Pindyck, 1996; Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2011; Bachmann and Bayer, 2009, 2013).
2see Arellano et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al. 2014.
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tainty and industry uncertainty using beta-free variance decomposition proposed by
Campbell etc. (2001). Empirical analysis shows that both fluctuations in aggre-
gate and disaggregate sector level uncertainties have statistically significant negative
effects on the sectoral entry rate.
I argue that the observed negative correlation between industry uncertainty and
entry rate is due to two reasons. On one hand, entrants are closely reliant on debt to
finance the initial investment and hiring activities, so increasing credit spread brought
up by aggregate and industry uncertainties push up the entry costs. On the other
hand, considering the negative impacts of uncertainty innovations on incumbents
through both real option channel and credit channel, the prospect upon entry become
less profitable. The entry rate declines as a result of rising costs and decreasing profits.
To illustrate it, I simulate a partial equilibrium industry model with dynamic entry.
Comparing to the productivity shock, the uncertainty shock has more persistent effect
on the entry rate and exit rate, and creates more persistence impact on aggregate
variables like investments and outputs, and generates a slow recovering pattern in the
aftermath of the shock.
This research is closely related to three strands of literature. The findings on
economic uncertainties and business cycles are consistent with those of Bloom etc.
(2012), Arrellano et al. (2012), Christiano et al. (2014), Gilchrist et al.(2014) etc.
While these literature consider the impacts on the incumbents, they do not model a
dynamic entry process. I contribute to literature by emphasizing how entrants can
amplify impacts of uncertainty shocks. Lee and Mukoyama (2012) and Clementi etc.
(2013) etc. find out that entry rate is greatly affected by technology shocks and it can
also amplify the shock. I incorporate these settings to uncertainty literature to analyze
the role of entrants played in business cycle upon uncertainty shocks. The third strand
of literature I refer to is dynamic corporate finance including Gomes(2001), Hennessy
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and Whited (2007) etc. The debt and equity pricing, and capital structure choice in
my model are similar to standard setup in these literature except that I now consider
uncertainties as additional shocks.
The remaining paper is organized as below. Section 2 discusses empirical analysis.
Section 3 builds a partial equilibrium structural model. Section 4 presents the results
from model simulations. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I examine the relationship between industry uncertainty, finan-
cial friction, and entry dynamics using both aggregate data and disaggregate sector
level data. To infer cross-industry and time-series variation in uncertainty, I use the
stock market data. The financial condition is proxied by the level of credit spreads.
The empirical evidence indicates that the impact of uncertainty on entry rate occurs
primarily through changes in credit spreads.
2.2.1 Data
The data sources I draw are Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS) of US Census
Bureau, Compustat, CRSP stock price data, and Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED).
Entry data are sourced from the Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS) of US Census
Bureau. BDS provides the total number of firms and establishments by age and
sectors. I select the number of firms with age equal to zero to represent the number
of entrants. The data is available for nine sectors according to Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes3from 1976 to 2013. Entry rate in sector i (Eit) is calculated
3These sectors and corresponding SIC-1 codes are: Agriculture Forestry, and Fishing (07); Mining
(10); Construction (15); Manufacturing (20); Transportation, Communication, and Public Utilities
(40); Wholesale Trade (50); Retail Trade (52); Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (60); Services
(70).
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as the number of entrants in the sector divided by the total of entrants across all the
nine sectors. For aggregate level entry rate (Et), I use average of sectoral level entry
rate.
External financial dependence for incumbents in each sector is calculated using
Compustat database following the methodology in Rajan and Zingales (1998). For
each firm j in sector4 i, external financial dependence measure (EFDij) is defined
as the difference between capital expenditures, CapExijt, and free cash flow, CFijt,
divided by capital expenditure5:
EFDij =
∑
tCapExijt −
∑
tCFijt∑
tCapExijt
.
A value of EFDij smaller than zero indicates that a firm has more cash flow than
capital expenditures and is thus less financially constrained. On the contrary, a
positive EFDij indicates that a firm is more financially constrained. The sample
period is from 1976 to 2015. Sectoral financial dependence EFDi is then chosen to
be median value across all firms in sector i.
Industry uncertainty is constructed using daily firm stock data of CRSP from
1976-2015. The excess daily return of firm j in sector i (Rijt) is defined as difference
between daily stock return and 30-day treasury bill daily return. The sector i excess
return Rit is defined as weighted sum of returns of firms in sector i : Rjt = wij,t−1Rijt
, where wij,t−1 is the weight of firm j in sector i in the last period. The market excess
return Rmt is defined as weighted sum of returns of all the sectors Rmt = wim,t−1Rit,
where wim,t−1 is the weight of sector i in the last period6.
For aggregate weighted monthly industry uncertainty σ2t , I use beta-free variance
decomposition proposed by Campbell etc. (2001): σ2t = V ar(Rmt)+
∑
iwim,t−1V ar(it)+
4The sector categorization in the rest of the paper follows the BDS standard.
5The Compustat code for capital expenditure and cash flow are CAPX and OANCF.
6Weight is defined as the product of stock price and outstanding shares.
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Σiwim,t−1Σj∈iwij,t−1V ar(ηij,t). it is defined in Rit = Rmt + it, and ˆV ar(it) =∑
s∈t(Ris−Rms)2 . ηij,t is defined inRijt = Rj,t+ηijt, and ˆV ar(ηijt) = Σs∈t (Rijs −Rjs)2.
Rijs, Ris, Rms are daily return at month t. For disaggregate sector level of monthly
industry uncertainty σ2it, industry beta βim needs to be estimated. σ2it = V ar(˜it),
where ˜it is defined in Rit = βimRmt+ ˜it. ˆV ar(˜it) =
∑
s∈t(Ris−βˆimRms)2 , where ˆβim
is the estimated industry beta. The yearly industry uncertainty is then the moving
average of the 12 monthly industry uncertainty.
Credit spreads (St) data are calculated as the yield spread between Moody’s Baa
Corporate Bond and 10-year treasury bond available from 1976 to 2015.
2.2.2 Empirical Specification
To see how the interaction of uncertainty and financial condition affect entry rate,
I use both aggregate and disaggregate data set to estimate the entry rate regression
respectively. Specifically, for aggregate data, I consider the following empirical entry
rate equation:
logEt = β0 + β1 log σt−1 + β2 logSt−1 + t.
I use lagged volatility and credit spreads in the aggregate regression here and
disaggregate below as I assume entrepreneurs decide if to entry the market next
period after they observe the current information. The results in column (a) of Table
3.3 indicate negative effect of uncertainty on the entry rate. The estimated elasticity
implies that increase in idiosyncratic volatility of 1 percentage is associated with
decline in industry average entry rate of 0.114 percent. In column (b), 1 percent
of credit spread increase is correlated with 0.059 percent decrease in entry rate. In
column (c) where both uncertainty and credit spread are included in regression , while
uncertainty shock remains its significance – 1 percent increase is associated with drop
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in the entry rate of 0.081 percent, the marginal effect of credit spread on entry rate
is insignificant, which is likely due to the endogeneity issue of uncertainty and credit
spread. All the results in this table support the argument that raising uncertainty
and worsening financial situation lead to declining industry entry rate.
Table 2.1: Aggregate level regression
(a) (b) (c)
log σt−1 -0.114∗∗∗ – -0.081∗
(0.039) (0.045)
logSt−1 – -0.059∗ -0.035
(0.022) (0.025)
Observations 37 37 37
Adjusted R2 0.175 0.145 0.196
Note: Sample period: 1976 - 2013 at an annual frequency. *,**,*** denote 10, 5, 1% significance.
Newey-West corrected standard errors in parentheses.
To exam if the above effects exists in the disaggregate sector level, I estimate the
entry rates in SIC one digit level nine sectors as below:
logEit = β0 + β1 log σit−1 + β2 logSt−1 + β3Xi × log σit−1 + γ1δi + it.
where Xi denotes external finance dependence or leverage of industry i ( EFDi or
leveragei) In addition to uncertainty and credit spreads, the equation includes a
sector fixed effect δi . Since there are no available sector-specific credit spread data,
I still use the aggregate level credit spread7 here. However, I include a cross term of
sectoral external financial dependence (or leverage) and uncertainty, so I can identify
if uncertainty shocks affect entry rate through financial channel. Comparing results
in column (a) and (b) of Table 2.2, fluctuations in uncertainty have statistically
significant negative effects on the sectoral entry rate if we measure the financial friction
7There are a few concerns with this particular specification of sectoral cost of fund. First, usually,
only large corporations have full access to the bonds market, which means the yields might not be
representative of the true cost of capital for entry firms. Secondly, as noted above, the credit spreads
are not cross-sectionally variational, which might reduce the effectiveness of parameter estimation.
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using leverage ratio. The estimated elasticity implies that increase in volatility of 1
percent depresses entry rate by at least 0.061 percent, and the more leveraged up a
sector is, the more it subjects to the uncertainty shocks. The result is robust when I
drop credit spread and replace it by year effects, as shown in column (c).
Table 2.2: Aggregate data regression
(a) (b) (c)
logSt−1 -0.099∗∗ -0.097∗ –
(0.047) (0.057)
log σit−1 -0.015 -0.061∗∗ -0.086∗∗
(0.010) (0.031) (0.039)
EFDi × log σit−1 -0.008 – –
(0.006)
leveragei × log σit−1 – -0.001∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
year effect N N Y
fixed effect Y Y Y
Observations 333 333 333
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.176 0.291
Note:Sample period: 1976 - 2013 at an annual frequency. Data are SIC 1 digit level. *,**,***
denote 10, 5, 1% significance. Standard errors clustered in sector level in parentheses.
To sum up, both fluctuations in aggregate and disaggregate sector level uncer-
tainties have statistically significant negative effects on the sectoral entry rate. In
particular, for industry where firms are more reliant on external financing, the uncer-
tainty impacts entry rate more drastically.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Technology and Uncertainty shocks
Time is discretized. There is a continuum of heterogeneous incumbents indexed by
j and entrants indexed by i. They are differentiated by their productivities which are
composed of homogeneous aggregate productivity At and idiosyncratic productivity
zj,t (for incumbents) or zi,t (for entrants). For incumbent, its productivities follow
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autoregressive processes:
logAt+1 = ρa logAt + σA,tt+1
log zj,t+1 = ρz log zj,t + σz,tj,t+1
where t and j,t indicate the technology shocks that are normal distributed with time
varying standard deviation σA,t, σz,t respectively; ρa, ρz measures the persistence of
the shocks. For entrant, the aggregate productivity follows the same procedure, but
idiosyncratic productivity is slightly different. It receives a signal qi,t at entry stage
about its initial idiosyncratic productivityzi,t+1. Given each signal, the realization of
the initial productivity zi,t+1 follows an autoregressive process
log zi,t+1 = ρq log qi,t + σq,ti,t+1
where i,t indicates the technology shock that is normal distributed with time varying
standard deviation σq,t; ρq measures the persistence of the shock.
I model uncertainty shocks as innovations to variations of technologies. In par-
ticular, I allow the variances of innovations to incumbents, σA,t and σz,t, and the
variance of innovation to the entrant productivity σq,t, to move over time according
to two-sate Markov chains, generating periods of low and high macro and micro un-
certainty. The volatility in At induces higher variability in aggregate variables like
GDP growth, while volatility in zj,t implies that cross-sectional dispersion-based mea-
sures of incumbents performance (output, sales etc.) are time-varying. The volatility
in zi,t implies that entrants’ performance are time-varying.
2.3.2 Incumbent Problem
For simplicity, I ignore time indexes in the following context unless needed. In-
cumbent produces y using capital k according to technology
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y = Azkα
Each period, incumbent borrows one period debt b′ at price q (I’ll talk more about
debt pricing later) to partially finance its investment i. Before it chooses how much
debt to borrow, it needs to decide if it pays off current debt b or default and exit.
Note that if not default, firm still expects to exit next period exogenously with an
probability of pi for non-financial reason. Investment incurs adjustment costs ACk.
Capital depreciates at rate δ. Revenue is subject to corporate tax with rate τ . Both
depreciation and debt interest costs are tax deductible. The dividend e is then defined
as below:
e = (1− τ)Azkα + τδk − i− ACk + τbr − b+ qb′
where
i = (k′ − (1− δ)k)
ACk = ψ0
i
k
i+ Ii<0S|i|
The firm is paying dividends if e ≥ 0, and receiving injection of equity from
shareholders if e < 0. Equity financing is costly in the sense that it needs to pay
extra amount of η times dividends to shareholder if dividends are negative.
In sum, incumbent decision is three-dimensional: whether it defaults? If not, how
much new debt to borrow? How much new capital to invest? All the decisions are to
maximize firm value V defined as the max of firm value if default VD and firm value
if not default VND. Default value is exogenously set to be zero. The problem can be
summarized as below.
V (A, z, σ, k, b) = max{VND(A, z, σ, k, b), VD}
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VD = 0
VND(A, z, σ, k, b) = max
k′,b′
{e(A, z, σ, k, k′, b, b′)(1+ηIe<0)+ pi
1 + r
EA,z,σ[V (A
′, z′, σ′, k′, b′)]}
2.3.3 Entry Decision
Each period there is a constant massM > 0 of potential entrants. As I note above,
each of them receives a Pareto distributed signal q ∼ Q(q) about their productivity.
I posit that q ≥ q ≥ 0 and that Q(q) = 1 −
(
q
q
)ξ
. All of them are endowed with
the same minimal capital kmin. To enter the industry, it decides how much capital
to invest, and, similar to incumbents, entrants finance investment through debt and
equity. Debt price and equity costs are denoted by qe and ηe respectively. I let ηe > η
implying that equity financing is more costly for entrants so they rely more on debt
comparing to incumbents. Also, investment incurs adjustment costs.
The dividend pre-entry ee is then termed as
ee(A, q, σ, k
′, b′) = −i− ψ0
2
(
i
k
)2
k + qe(A, q, σ, k
′, b′)b′
and the value function upon entry
Ve(A, q, σ) = max
k′,b′
ee(A, q, σ, k
′, b′)(1 + ηeIe<0) +
1
1 + r
EA,q,σ[V (A
′, z′, σ′, k′, b′)]
Entrant has to pay fixed costs Ce to enter the industry, so the entry decision is
made by comparing Ve and Ce, and entry happens only if Ve is larger than Ce.
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2.3.4 Debt Contracts
Investors are risk neutral, meaning price of debt adjusts such that investors break
even in expectation. Denotes the risk-free rate as rf , and risky debt interest rate as rb,
the standard no-arbitrage arguments then imply the following bond pricing formula:
(1 + rf )b
′ =
1− ∫
D
dF ((A′, z′, σ′) | (A, z, σ))
 (1 + rb)b′+∫
D
RC(A′, z′, σ′, k′)dF ((A′, z′, σ′) | (A, z, σ)) (2.1)
where D is the default set of states, in which firm default on its debt obligations,
RC is the recovery amount of firm value conditional on default, and F is conditional
distribution of all the shocks:
D = {(A, z, σ, k, b) s.t. VND(A, z, σ, k, b) ≤ 0}
RC(A, z, σ, k) = (1− ) ((1− τ)Azkα + τδk + (1− δ)k)
 measures the liquidation costs conditional on default.
Define the debt price q = 1
1+rb
, then for incumbents
q (A, z, σ, k′, b′) =
1− ∫D dF ((A′, z′, σ′) | (A, z, σ))
1 + rf −
∫
D
RC(A′,z′,σ′,k′)
b′ dF ((A
′, z′, σ′) | (A, z, σ))
and for entrants
qe (A, q, σ, k
′, b′) =
1− ∫D dG((A′, z′, σ′) | (A, q, σ))
1 + rf −
∫
D
RC(A′,z′,σ′,k′)
b′ dG((A
′, z′, σ′) | (A, q, σ))
2.4 Model Solution and Simulation
I solve the model using numerical method. Table 1 lists all the parameter values.
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Parameter Value Source
value-added share of capital α = 0.3 Gilchrist, Sim, Zakrajsek
(2014)
discount rate β = 0.99 Gilchrist, Sim, Zakrajsek
(2014)
risk-free rate rf = 1/β − 1
depreciation rate δ = 0.025 NIPA depreciation
resale cost for disinvestment S = 0.339 Bloom(2009)
convex adjustment cost ψ0 = 0.0375 Begenau and Salomao
(2016)
default cost ξ = 0.1 Hennessey and Whited
(2007)
costly equity finance η1 = 0.3 Cooley and Quadrini
(2001)
exogenous exit rate pi = 0.05 quarterly business exit
rate
cond. prob of unc shock: low to high piLH = 0.026 Bloom et al. (2012)
cond. prob of unc shock: high to high piHH = 0.943 Bloom et al. (2012)
unc. of hetero. productivity:low σz,L = 0.05 Bloom et al. (2012)
unc. of agg. productivity:low σa,L = 0.0067 Bloom et al. (2012)
multiple of unc. of hetero. productivity mz = 4.1 Bloom et al. (2012)
multiple of unc. of agg. productivity ma = 1.6 Bloom et al. (2012)
persistence of hetero. productivity ρz = 0.95 Bloom et al. (2012)
persistence of agg. productivity ρa = 0.95 Bloom et al. (2012)
enry cost Ce = 640 exit = entry
pareto distribution parameter  = 1.7 Clementi and
Palazzo(2016)
persistence of signal ρq = 0.95 Clementi and
Palazzo(2016)
Table 2.3: Parametrization
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2.4.1 Incumbents
To understand how uncertainty shocks affect industry dynamics through exit chan-
nel, we need to know how debt price changes at shocks, and how incumbent debt
choice respond to price change, which are illustrated in Figure 2·1. Focusing first
on left panel. Consistent with literature in dynamic corporate finance, given today’s
debt position, technology and capital, the higher debt amount the firm demands, the
lower unit debt market price it faces (that is, higher debt interest rate ). Further-
more, debt price varies with uncertainty shocks. In particular, firm faces lower debt
market price (i.e. higher interest rate) in more volatile economic environment. Given
this debt contract, the right panel of the figure displays firm’s optimal debt tomor-
row as function of current leverage. In general, the new debt amount increases with
leverage, and the higher the uncertainty, the lower debt the firm demands in the next
period. That is saying, unexpected shocks in uncertainties lead to firm deleveraging,
which helps to explain why we observe massive deleveraging during financial crisis –
economic uncertainties usually spike up during financial turbulence.
Figure 2·2 illustrates how uncertainty shocks impact firm default decision. The
black solid line plots the stationary firm distribution over leverage. The red solid and
blue dash line indicate the threshold leverage above which firm claims default. As it
shows in figure, higher uncertainty would shift threshold lower, implying more firms
default and exit the industry, which pushes up the exit rate as result.
2.4.2 Entrants
As the most important question, I want to know how uncertainties impact en-
trants’ decisions. Figure 2·3 illustrates entrants’ initial debt and capital choices con-
ditional on signal. Both initial debt and capital are increasing in signal. This is not
hard to understand considering that productivity of entrant is positively correlated
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Figure 2·1: Incumbent debt pricing and debt choice
Figure 2·2: Incumbent’s distribution and default threshold
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to signal, and the higher the expected productivity, the more capital the entrant
wants to invest. Since the capital endowment of entrant is fixed and limited, it needs
to leverage up to meet the capital requirement. In addition, given the signal, en-
trants demand less debt and capital when it is subject to higher uncertainties as debt
financing become more costly in such high volatile economic environment.
Figure 2·4 sheds light on uncertainty’s entry decision. The thin vertical lines plot
the threshold of signal above which entrant decides to enter. With higher uncertainty,
entrants faces increasing threshold, implying that overall entry rate goes down. To see
why, we need to take a look at entrant’s value function, indicated by the thick lines.
In general, it is increasing in initial signals. What’s more, considering the negative
impacts uncertainty shocks have on investment, the value function is decreasing in
uncertainty level. Recall that entry happens only if entrant finds entry value is higher
then the fixed entry costs. Since entry value is decreasing in uncertainty, higher signal
level is then required for entrants to enter the industry in more volatile economy.
2.4.3 Simulation
To see implications on business cycle, I simulate an economy of 5000 heterogeneous
firms for 50 periods, and plot impulse response functions of major economic variables
including investment, output, debt outstanding, credit spread, entry rate and exit
rate.
Figure 2·5 supports the argument that uncertainty affect the economy mainly
through credit channel. According to the figure, without financial friction, that is,
both incumbents and entrants obtain equity financing at no cost and don’t rely on
debt financing, uncertainty shocks have less impact on output due to more diminished
impacts on investment as well as industry dynamics.
As a robust check, I run the simulation with respect to different sets of parameters
governing the underlying uncertainty process. Following Bloom etc.(2012), I choose
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Figure 2·3: Entrant’s debt and investment choice
Figure 2·4: Entrant’s value function and entry threshold
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baseline parameters of uncertainty shock process pointing to a significant jump in
both micro and macro volatility, a significant persistence of the uncertainty process,
and a moderately high frequency of uncertainty. To exam if the economic response
pattern to uncertainty shock is sensitive to these parameter value, I simulate the
model with a reduction of 25% in (1) persistence of high uncertainty piHH , (2) the
likelihood of transition from low uncertainty to high uncertainty piLH , (3) the jump
in micro uncertainty mz, (4) the jump in macro uncertainty ma, (5) the magnitude of
baseline micro uncertainty σz, (6) and the magnitude of baseline macro uncertainty
σa. Figure 2·6 presents the simulation of output response to uncertainty shock with
these alternative sets of parameters. According to the figure, the impulse responses
of output generally maintain the baseline pattern, suggesting that the model results
are robust to a wide range of parameter value. The only exception is the reduction
of persistence of uncertainty shock which leads to less persistent impulse response of
output. This is suggesting that the impact of uncertainty shock is sensitive to the
exogenous persistence of uncertainty shocks.
2.5 Conclusion
Empirical evidence documented in this paper suggests that unexpected surging
economic uncertainty hurts startups through credit channel: rising default rate ac-
companying heightened economic turbulences drives up credit spreads; with startups
facing increasing funding costs, entry barrier goes up and entry rate declines. Through
an industry model incorporating dynamic entry and exit, I show that unexpected hik-
ing uncertainty is more devastating than negative technology shock in a sense that it
generates larger and more persistent impact on economic outputs.
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Figure 2·5: Comparison of impact of uncertainty shock
Figure 2·6: Comparison of models with and without financial frictions
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Chapter 3
Risk-taking Behavior and Bargaining Power
The 2007-2009 credit crunch ended with up bailouts of several deeply distressed
financial conglomerates. Deemed as "systematically important", these financial in-
stitutions were putting the whole U.S. financial system on the verge of breaking
down if the government just stood by. Years before the crisis, driven by skyrocket-
ing housing price, the financial magnates went knee-deep in then extremely lucrative
mortgage backed security market, being blind to increasing risks accompanying ab-
normal returns. In hindsight, a natural question to ask is that, considering the strong
bargaining power of these "too big to fail" banks in their final bailouts, is there a
necessary connection between the risk-taking behavior and firms’ bargaining power?
To be specific, firm’s bargaining power is defined as shareholders’ bargaining power
as opposed to bondholders’. In general, it can be proxied by at least three factors.
(1) Firm size. The coordination of bondholders’ interests is more complex in large
firms than that in small firms which tend to have more concentrated lenders, and
this gives the edge of shareholders over bondholders in the case of negotiation. (2)
Assets tangibility. Since costs to liquidate assets decrease in tangibility, creditors are
more averse to bankruptcy if the firm have more non-physical assets like intellectual
properties etc. This increases bargaining power of shareholders in debt renegotiation.
(3) Inside ownership. Inside ownership increases shareholders’ bargaining power as it
further aligns incentives of management and shareholders.
Intuitively, factors determining firm’s bargaining power affect firm’s risk-shifting
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behaviors as well. For example, tangible assets allow firms issue more secured debts
which gives bondholders title to pledged assets until the debt is paid in full, and
thus limits shareholders’ ability to substitute assets and shift risk (Smith and Warner
(1979). Also, investment decisions are made by the managers, therefore risk-shifting
behaviors depend on the extent to which managers’ and shareholders’ interests are
aligned.
However research on firm’s bargaining power and its risk choice are limited.
Mostly, current research focus on how bargaining power affects a firm’s capital struc-
ture, corporate debt default probabilities and yield spread. Fan and Sundaresan
(2000) develop a framework to model the strategic interaction between bondholders
and shareholders in a game-theoretic setting which can accommodate varying bar-
gaining powers to the two claimants. Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland(2003) shows
that optimal debt structure hinges upon the division of ex-post bargaining power
between the firm and bank. Weak firms utilize bank debt exclusively, and strong
firms use a mixture of bank and market debt, with bank debt senior. Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007) examine the question how strategic actions of borrowers and
lenders would affect corporate debt values and find out higher bond spreads for firms
that can renegotiate debt contracts relatively easily.
This paper is related to a central question in corporate finance – the choice of in-
vestment financing and its link to optimal risk exposure, which has been extensively
examined in research. Jensen and Meckling (1976) raise the agency problem between
shareholders and bondholders that has been termed as “ asset substitution” : share-
holders who issue debt before deciding on investment policy can potentially extract
value from bondholders by increasing investment risk after debt is in place. Gav-
ish and Kalay(1983) formalize the asset ‘substitution question through a one-period
model and investigate the leverage effect on the incentive of shareholders. Green and
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Talmor (1986) take a step further and derive a firm’s optimal risk policy in a similar
setting. Leland(1994), Leland and Toft(1996) develop a continuous time model for
equity and debt pricing and optimal leverage. As a means to measure the scope of
asset substitution, a comparative statics of debt and equity with respect to asset risk
has been examined. Leland(1998) further shows that agency cost restrict the leverage
and debt maturity and increase the yield spread but their importance is relatively
small for the range of environment considered. Ericsson(2000) provide close form
solution for the similar question and provide quantitative illustrations of how the
capital structure could be affected by the potential of asset substitution.
To find out how firm’s bargaining power affect risk-shifting incentives of sharehold-
ers, this paper builds a model incorporating the debt renegotiation where bargaining
power plays a significant role, through which I identify relationship between bargain-
ing power and firm’s risk-shifting incentives.
The paper is organized as below: Section 1 describes the model. Section 2 exam-
ines how ex-post choice of risk is affected by the bargaining power in debt renegotia-
tion. Section 3 provides empirical evidences consistent with model results. Section 4
concludes.
3.1 Model
Consider a firm whose unlevered asset follows the Wiener process
dV
V
= (µ− δ) dt+ σdW
where µ is the expected firm asset value growth rate, δ is the expected payout rate,
σ ∈ [σL, σH ] is the volatility (standard deviation) of asset return and dW is the
increment of Wiener process. Initial value of asset is set to be V0. A risk-free asset
exists and pays constant compound rate of interest r. The firm initially operates at
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lower risk level σL after debt is issued, but it can choose to shift to high risk level σH
ex-post to maximize the equity value.
There are three stages in a firm’s operation. At first stage, debt is issued and the
firm is operated at low risk. At second stage, if the firm performs bad and assets
value continue to drop,shareholders make risk-shifting choice ex-post, that is, firm
starts to invest in more aggressive projects and run at higher level of risk. One
thing noteworthy is that the switching point of risk-shifting cannot be written into
contract ex-ante. Once debts are in place, shareholders take the capital structure
as given and choose the optimal switching point by maximizing equity value. At
the third stage, if the firm’s financial situation continue to worsen, instead forcing
the firm into liquidation, bondholders agree on strategic debt service – the firm pays
reduced coupon until the the fortune is improved. The amount of coupon deduction
depends on the bargaining power of each party in the Nash bargaining game. This
type of debt renegotiation could happen due to two reasons. First, liquidation is
costly, and a Nash equilibrium bargaining on the current firm value can make both
shareholders and bondholders better off (Fan and Sundaresan (2000)). Second, by
avoiding liquidation, the firm keeps the tax shield 1 which increases the firm value.
The triggering point for the strategic debt service depends on the firm’s operation in
previous stage, thus it can’t be contracted ex-ante.
3.1.1 Valuation
This subsection discusses valuation of the firm, the firm’s equity and debts.
All decision makers in the three stages are rational and forward looking. Denote
the triggering points for risk-shifting and strategic debt service as VR and VS. The
three stages are then termed as V ∈ {[VS,∞] , [VR, VS] , [0, VR]}. Denote firm value
1The firm will lose the tax benefit temporarily in the period of coupon deduction, but will regain
it once it’s back to normal operation
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as v(V ), equity value as E(V ), so debt value is the difference D(V ) = v(V )− E(V ).
To focus on the relationship between the possible risk-shifting at second stage and
bargaining power in strategic debt service at third stage, debt is simplified to be
permanent debt. The debt is characterized by X = {C,P} , where C is the coupon
payment, P = D(V0) , that is, debt is issued at par.
Firm Valuation
Following Merton(1974), the general solution for firm value is :
v(V ) =

vL(V ) = V + τC
r
+ a1LV
x1L + a2LV
x2L , VS < V <∞
vH(V ) = V + τC
r
+ a1HV
x1H + a2HV
x2H , VR < V ≤ VS
vR(V ) = V + a1RV
x1H + a2RV
x2H , 0 ≤ V ≤ VS
where τ is the tax rate, and
x1L =
−
(
r − δ − σ2L
2
)
+
√(
r − δ − σ2L
2
)2
+ 2σ2Lr
σ2L
> 0,
x2L =
−
(
r − δ − σ2L
2
)
−
√(
r − δ − σ2L
2
)2
+ 2σ2Lr
σ2L
< 0,
x1H =
−
(
r − δ − σ2H
2
)
+
√(
r − δ − σ2H
2
)2
+ 2σ2Hr
σ2H
> 0,
x2H =
−
(
r − δ − σ2H
2
)
−
√(
r − δ − σ2H
2
)2
+ 2σ2Hr
σ2H
< 0.
.
Note that in the stage of debt renegotiation, bondholders receive reduced coupon
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payment, and the firm therefore loses tax benefit temporarily. This is reflected in the
third stage that the firm’s value is V instead of V + τC
r
. The coupon payment and
tax shield will return to normal when the firm is recovered from distress, that is, V is
improved above VR. It is assumed that, before the debt renegotiation, coupons will
always be paid in full, and equity will be issued to financing the debt payment if the
firm’s earning falls below coupon payments.
The coefficients a = {a1L, a2L, a1H , a2H , a1R, a2R} are solved by boundary condi-
tions taking VS and VR as given. As V ↑ ∞, v(V ) → V + Cr , therefore a1L = 0. As
V ↓ 0, v(V ) → 0, therefore a2R = 0. By the value matching and smooth pasting
condition at VS and VR,
a2LV
x2L
S = a1HV
x1H
S + a2HV
x2H
S
a2Lx2LV
x2L−1
S = a1Hx1HV
x1H−1
S + a2Hx2HV
x2H−1
S
τC
r
+ a1HV
x1H
R + a2HV
x2H
R = a1RV
x1H
R
a1Hx1HV
x1H−1 + a2Hx2HV
x2H−1
R = a1Rx1HV
x1H−1
R
Solving the above four equations, we have:
a2H =
τC
r
x1H
x2H − x1H V
−x2H
R
a1H =
τC
r
x1H
x2H − x1H
x2H − x2L
x2L − x1H V
−x2H
R V
x2H−x1H
S
a2L =
τC
r
x1H
x2L − x1H V
−x2H
R V
x2H−x2L
S
a1R =
τC
r
V −x1HR +
τC
r
x1H
x2L − x1H V
−x2H
R V
x2H−x1H
S
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Equity Valuation
The general solution for equity value is:
E(V ) =

EL(V ) = V − (1−τ)C
r
+ b1LV
x1L + b2LV
x2L , VS < V <∞
EH(V ) = V − (1−τ)C
r
+ b1HV
x1H + b2HV
x2H , VR < V ≤ VS
ER(V ) = θ∗v(V ) = θ∗ (V + a1RV x1H ) , 0 ≤ V ≤ VS
Note that the pricing formula at the third stage ER(V ) describes equity value in
strategic debt service. According to Fan and Sundaresan (2000), through a bargaining
game in the debt renegotiation, bondholders accept less than the contractual coupon
and still permit shareholders to run the firm. This equilibrium result makes both
bondholder and shareholder better off than they are in absolute priority rule. θ∗ in
the pricing formula ER(v) is the Nash equilibrium solution to the bargaining game
that can be characterized as
θ∗ = argmax {θv(V )}η {(1− θ)v(V )− (1− α)V }1−η
= η(1− (1− α)V
v(V )
)
θ is the parameter reflecting the sharing rule of residual assets, η the bargaining
power of shareholder, and α the proportional cost of liquidation.
Similar to firm valuation, b = {b1L, b2L, b1H , b2H} are coefficients to be determined
by the boundary conditions. As V ↑ ∞, E(V ) → V − (1−τ)C
r
, therefore b1L = 0. By
value matching and smooth pasting condition at VS and VR,
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b2LV
x2L
S = b1HV
x1H
S + b2HV
x2H
S
b2Lx2LV
x2L−1
S = b1Hx1HV
x1H−1
S + b2Hx2HV
x2H−1
S
VR − (1− τ)C
r
+ b1HV
x1H
R + b2HV
x2H
R = η (a1RV
x1H
R + αVR)
1 + b1Hx1HV
x1H−1
R + b2Hx2HV
x2H−1
R = η
(
a1Rx1HV
x1H−1
R + α
)
{b2L, b1H , b2H} are solved accordingly:
b2H =
x1H
x2H − x1H
[(
1− 1
x1H
)
(1− αη)VR − (1− τ)C
r
]
V −x2HR
b1H =
x2H − x2L
x2L − x1H
x1H
x2H − x1H
[(
1− 1
x1H
)
(1− αη)VR − (1− τ)C
r
]
V −x2HR V
x2H−x1H
S
b2L =
x1H
x2L − x1H
[(
1− 1
x1H
)
(1− αη)VR − (1− τ)C
r
]
V −x2HR V
x2H−x2L
S
Debt value is easy to derive by solving the difference of firm value and equity
value.
3.1.2 Triggering Point for Strategic Debt Service
The switching point VS and VR cannot be contracted ex-ante, rather they are
determined ex-post by shareholders to maximize equity value after debts are in place.
Risk shifting point VS affects triggering point for strategic debt service VR. To see
the point, plug the solution for coefficients b1H , b2H into the equity value matching
condition at V = VR
VR − (1− τ)C
r
+ b1H (VS, VR, C)V
x1H
R + b2H (VS, VR, C)V
x2H
R = η (a1RV
x1H
R + αVR)
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This relationship illustrates that shareholders take the final debt renegotiation into
consideration when they’re making ex-post risk-shifting decision. There is no close
form solution for VR as a function of VS and C. To explore quantitative relationship
between these two triggering points later, I define
h (VS, VR, C) ≡ VR − (1− τ)C
r
+ b2HV
x2H−x1H
S
x2H − x2L
x2L − x1H V
x1H
R + b2HV
x2H
R
−η
((
τC
r
V −x1HR +
τC
r
x1H
x2L − x1H V
−x2H
R V
x2H−x1H
S
)
V x1HR + αVR
)
so that
∂VR
∂VS
= −∂h/∂VS
∂h/∂VR
.
3.1.3 Triggering Point for Risk shifting Ex-post
Following Leland(1998), ex-post risk-shifting point V = VS is the one when share-
holders maximize its equity value taking capital structure, i.e. coupon payment
C, as given. Once VS is solved, VR can be pinned down accordingly by solving
h(VS, VR, C) = 0. The optimization problem can be characterized as
max
C
v(V0, VS, VR, C)
s.t. max
VS ,VR
EL(V, VS, VR, C)|V=VS
s.t. h (VS, VR, C) = 0
That is, shareholders and bondholders maximize initial firm value by choosing
optimal debt amount. The maximization problem in constraints shows that they
are forward-looking and consider the possibility of ex-post risk-shifting. Sharehold-
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Table 3.1: Parameters Value
Initial unlevered asset value V0 100
Security payout rate δ .05
Risk free interest rate r .06
Low risk level σL .2
High risk level σH .3
Tax rate τ .2
Liquidation cost α .25
ers decide the optimal risk-shifting switching point ex post given the fixed capital
structure and considering the decision’s effect on future strategic debt service. The
optimization problem above is equivalent to
max
C,VS ,VR
v(V0, VS, VR, C)
s.t.
h (VS, VR, C) = 0
∂EL(V, VS, VR, C)
∂VS
|V=VS +
EL(V, VS, VR, C)
∂VR
∂VR
∂VS
|V=VS = 0
There is no close form solution for C, VS, VR, and I solve the problem numerically.
3.2 Comparative Statics
In this section, I solve the model numerically and study the relationship between
shareholders’ bargaining power and risk-shifting behaviors. Base parameter values
are listed in Table 3.1.
Figure 3·1 plots risk-shifting switching point against the bargaining power. Ac-
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Figure 3·1: Variation of Risk-shifting Switching Point with Bargaining
Power
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cording to the figure, as shareholders’ bargaining power varies between 0.6 - 1, risk-
shifting triggering point increases from 74 to 77. That is, if a firm’s operation worsens
and unlevered asset value drops from initial 100 below 80, shareholders start to take
more risky projects. This result is consistent to Leland(1998) where he considers
the finite maturity debts with endogenous bankruptcy. Furthermore, the risk-shifting
decision takes into consideration shareholders’ bargaining power in the final debt
renegotiation if the firm continues to deteriorate. The positive correlation reflects
“asset substitution” problem. One thing worth noticing is that the risk-shifting point
increases nonlinearly in bargaining power. The switching point of risk-shifting in-
crease between 0.8-1 almost triples the increase between 0.6-0.8, implying that the
“asset substitution” problem is more severe for firm with higher bargaining power in
shareholders.
Figure 3·2 plots risk-shifting switching point against the volatility of higher risk
assets. It illustrates that the riskier the prospect projects are, the more motivated
the distressed firm is to invest in these projects and shift into higher risk of opera-
tion, which is consistent with leland(1998) and Eisdorfer(2008). The result comple-
ments to real option theory about investment which claims that firm facing higher
future uncertainty will cut down investment due to wait-and-see effect. Consider-
ing risk-shifting incentives, traditional negative relationship between investment and
uncertainty should be less significant for distressed firms than for healthy firms.
3.3 Data and Empirical Test
In this section, I explore data to test two hypothesis derived from the model:
• Hypothesis 1: For financially distressed firm, due to risk-shifting incentive, the
waiting time of riskier investment goes down, implying that expected investment
increases with economic uncertainty. This would partially cancel out or even
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Figure 3·2: Variation of Risk-shifting Switching Point with Asset
Volatility
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pct. 50th pct 75th Pct. Obs.
Investment 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.16 54382
Z-score 3.33 2.99 2.10 1.83 2.99 4.50 54382
Size 429.76 161.48 570.64 41.41 161.48 592.48 54382
Q 1.21 0.99 0.80 0.73 0.99 1.43 54382
Leverage 0.27 0.21 0.24 0.06 0.21 0.43 54382
Lag Cash flow 0.12 0.13 0.31 0.03 0.13 0.26 54382
reverse the "wait-and-see" effect we usually observe, that is, firm increases the
waiting time when facing higher uncertainty.
• Hypothesis 2: The risk-shifting incentive is larger for firms with larger bargain-
ing power in shareholders, implying that expected investment increases with
bargaining power.
3.3.1 Data Description
I consider U.S. firms over the 1987–2014 period with data available from COM-
PUSTAT on investment intensity, financial distress, size, investment opportunity (Q),
leverage and cash flow (which will be defined shortly). All the series are deflated to
2004 dollars using CPI. To reduce the effect of outliers, I take the following steps.
First, I eliminate firm-year observations for which the investment intensity, financial
distress, size, and cash flow are in the top and bottom 10% percentiles to remove
outliers. Second, I winsorize the Q by 10 and leverage by 0.99. The basic sample
consists of an unbalanced panel with 54,382 firm-year observations .
Table 3.2 describes the computation and reports summary statistics for the vari-
ables used in the main tests. It resembles those found in related studies. To measure
firm’s expectation of uncertainty, I consider volatility of stock returns based on data
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from CRSP over the period of 1950 to 2014. Pindyck (1991) argues that increased
uncertainty in the product markets is translated into increased volatility in the stock
market. Leahy and Whited (1996) reason that stock returns capture the changing
aspects of a firm’s environment that is important to investors. Additionally, Berk,
Green, and Naik (1999) show that time variation in asset returns are driven by the
firm’s expectations about its returns from assets in place and from potential growth
options.
Three proxy variables are used to measure the bargaining power: firm size, asset
tangibility, and managerial ownership. I use the log market value of firm’s asset to
measure the asset size, the plant, property and equipment scaled by the book value
of asset as the tangibility, and percent of stock shares held by the top executives of a
firm to measure the inside ownership.
3.3.2 Empirical Specification
To test the above hypotheses, I run the following regression:
INVit = α + β1σE,it + β2BPproxy,it + β3DitσE,it + β4DitBPproxy,it + δt + δi + it
Invit is the ratio of capital expenditure (Compustat code CAPX) and beginning
of the year Property, Plant and Equipment (code PPEGT).
σE,it is the expected volatility of the product market at the beginning of the year.
The difference of the coefficient of σE between two groups measures the incentive
of risk-shifting. I use the expected industry volatility instead of firm level volatility
to minimize the endogenous problem in model estimation caused by the potential
dependency of firm-level volatility on the other control variables. First, I calculate
the monthly value-weighted industry returns based on the 2-digit SIC code for the
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period of 1950 to 2014. Second, a GARCH (1,1) model is applied to the return
series of each industry separately. Third, the 12-month-ahead volatility forecast for
the sample period 1987 to 2014 is computed at the beginning of each year using the
model estimates.
BP proxyit is the proxy variable for bargaining power. For the purpose of robust-
ness, I choose
BP proxyit ∈ {tangiit, logsizeit, ishareit}, which respectively represents inverse
tangibility (note that the bargaining power is decreasing in tangibility), log market
value of asset and inside ownership defined in the above. The coefficient of cross
term BP proxy × σE β2 measures the effect of bargaining power on the risk-shifting
incentive.
Dit is the dummy variable indicating firm’s financial state. Dit = 0 indicates
financially distressed state and Dit = 1 indicates financially healthy state. To dis-
tinguish the two states, I calculate firm’s Z-score following Altman(1968). The lower
the Zscore, the more financially distressed a firm is. Traditionally, a cut-off point to
distinguish distressed firm and non-distressed firm is 1.81.
3.3.3 Empirical Results
Table 3.3 shows the regression results. I run three versions of the model.
In model (1) (column (2)), I regress investment on expected uncertainty for both
financially distressed firm and healthy firms. β1 for σE,it, which captures the corre-
lation for financially distressed firm, is significantly positive, supporting hypothesis
1. β3 for DitσE,it is significantly negative, indicating that risk-shifting incentive for
financially distressed firm counteracts the normal wait-and-see effect.
In model (2) (column (3)-(5)), I regress expected investment on bargaining power
for two types of firms using a variety of proxy variables for bargaining power. β2 for
BPproxy,it is significantly positive, and β3 for DitBPproxy,it is significantly negative,
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except the one when I use inside ownership as proxy variable. This suggests that the
expected investment increases with the bargaining power for the financially distressed
firms, and this correlation weakens for healthy firms, supporting the hypothesis 2.
In model (3) (column (6)-(8)) where all the explanatory variables are included,
coefficients maintain their sign and statistical significance, which further supports the
argument that expected investment increases with expected business uncertainty and
shareholders’ bargaining power for financially distressed firms.
Table 3.3: Regression results
(1) (2) (3)
logsize tangi ishare logsize tangi ishare
σE,it
0.07∗
(0.06)
0.06∗
(0.05)
0.05∗
(0.04)
0.07∗
(0.06)
BPproxy,it
0.02∗∗
(0.01)
0.08∗∗
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
0.03∗∗
(0.02)
0.05∗∗∗
(0.03)
0.00∗
(0.00)
DitσE,it
−0.09∗∗
(0.05)
−0.07∗
(0.04)
−0.07∗∗
(0.04)
−0.09∗∗
(0.05)
DitBPproxy,it
−0.01∗
(0.01)
−0.06∗∗
(0.03)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.03∗
(0.02)
−0.04∗∗
(0.02)
0.00
(0.00)
Adj.R2 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.09
Obs. 54,382 54,382 54,382 54,382 54,382 54,382 54,382
Note: Sample period: 1987-2014, yearly. Standard deviation in the parenthesis. *,**,*** repre-
sent 90%,95%,90% confidence level respectively.
3.4 Conclusion
The paper investigates how shareholders’ bargaining power affects firm’s ex-post
selection of operation risk once debts are in place. Through comparative statics
about risk-shifting triggering point, two hypotheses are proposed. First, due to risk-
shifting incentive, the negative relationship between investments and uncertainty for
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financially distressed firms can be counteracted or even reversed, comparing with that
for healthy firms. Second, The risk-shifting incentive is larger for firms with larger
bargaining power in shareholders. Empirical study on database Compustat supports
the above hypotheses.
The model is restrictive in a way that I consider the permanent debt as the only
debt type, thus the interaction of debt maturity and effect of bargaining power on
risk-shifting incentive is neglected. Relaxing the assumption should be the direction
of future research.
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